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IN THE SUPREME COURT

of the
STATE OF UTAH

IN RE
GRAXT 1IACFARLA:'\ I•;

No. 9051

BRIEF OF "Pl•:'ffTlONI!JR

IN'I'RODrCTORY STATEMENT
Disciplinary proceedings were instituted by the
Utah State Bar agaim;t petitioner Grant Macfarlane, by
issuance of a citation and complaint June 26, 1957 (R.
1, 3), following an ex parte investigation of the record
compiled in the civil will conte~t case eut.itl0d "In re
Su;an's Estate" (Utah, 1950) 293 P.2d G82.
The Bar charged petitioner with unprofessional conduct in the preparation of a will and codicils for his
client, Wilda Gail Swan. All allegations of unprofes-
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2
sional conduct were denied by the petitioner's answGr
(R. 5).
'rhe Trial Committee of the llar, composed of three
Ogden la\\-")'ers, called a pretrial hearing August 2D,
195i, in an effort to narrow the issues and to avoid a

retrial of the will contest case. Jt was recognized that
this Court, in the Swan case, ruled that a presumption
of fraud and undue influence arose from the fact that
the petitioner was a beneficiary under a will prepared

hv him for his client.
The Prosecuting Committee stated at pretrial, and
reaffirmed later upon oral argument, that it did not
have any "evidence of fraud beyond the presumption"
and that "these fach, 11·ithout the preo:wnption, won't
><ustain a finding of fraud or undue influence. We'>e
got to haw the presumption rnade." (R. :l61; pretrial
hearing, page 28).
It was thereupon agreed that the Prosecuting Committee would rt•\'iC'II- the three 1·olumes of the record
in tl1P IYill contest ('fl~e and would ,;c•lrd therefrom such
portions of that record a,; were deemed relevant and
material to the issues in this proceeding. Petitioner \\a~
given an equal opportunit~· and both sides had the right
to produce additional witnr~n~.s at the time of the hearin~< wl1i(·h \\·a~ ultimately rondueted January· 9, 1958.

II

At the hrariJlg', which consumed less than one day,
thr Prosecuting Committee presented its case, consisting
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3
nl' coudensalions of some of the testimony from j lu·
will contest c~~e and, in some instances, vertinent testimony in the form of question~ and answc1·s, a~kcrl and
an~~~·ercd upon the civil ca~Q. 'l'lw only testimony given
in per~on was that lJl'esented !J.' tlw petitioner who
te~tilied cont'erning hi~ pL·r~onnl and profec<~ional hi::;t.ory and who then offered himself for cross-examination,
altlwugh neither the 'J'rial Connnittcc nor the "ProsPruting CommittPt> chose to r·xaminP ltim.

The court rcpodcr in attendance wa::; tlit•rc·ttpon
a~ked to compile the recoed by copying thf' extracts
from the qnP~Iion and ans,c;,-er te~tinwny and 11.1· im;erting the tondcn::;ations of testimony into a nC\\' and
complete record for thi::; }1carir1g. In doinp: so, the reporter reeorded the variou:;; ohjedions which had h0en
raised by petitiont>r to ~orne of the evidence offered by
the Pro~prnt in)!: Committee, ·which ol1jections had been
taken undE'r advisement by the Trial Committee pending
tlw completion of the entire rerord.
The matter was called for l'urther !rearing April
30, 1958, at \l·l1ich time the 'l'tial {;ommittee heard oral
argwnen( as i~ revealed hy the reeorU beginning at
page 352.
The decillion of the Trial Committee was rendered
September 25, 195K, and its recommocndation for di~ri
plinary action was adopted by a majority of the Doar·d
of Commis~ioncr:; of the l~t.ah Slate Bar !\larch 25, 1959.
'fhe Connni::;sioners reeonnnended to tbis Court the
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e~try of an order suspending petitioner from the practice of law for a period of one year and until he b€

recommended for reinstatement by the Board of Commissioners and, in addition, that he be required to pay
the costs of the disciplinary proceedings.
Petitioner filed l1i~ petition for review of the recommendation April 29, 1959, and now submits his brief in
support thereof.

The foregoing explanation is offered to assist the
Court in Hs examination and review of the somewhat
unusual reoord upon which this prosecution must rest.

Wilda Gail Swan died, without issue and unmarried,
m 1952, at the age of 62. From 1944 until her d~:mth,
petitioner was her lawyer and her friend. He repre,;ented her in nmnProns business transactions relating
to her variou~ Jlrop0l'tiP~ in Salt Lake City. (R. 116).
In 1947, at l11n TT•!l]('~t. petitioner drafted her Last
\\'ill and Testament, in \1·hiel1 he was named a~ one of
tlw benefidar:ie~. In 1950, at l1er request, he drafted a
codicil and. in 1951, a secOIJd <'ndi('i\. The will, as modified hy tht' second codicil, n:wairwrl unchangE>d until
l1N dPatl1. (R. :i,"ti).

When the fi1·st codicil wn>< t'V'('Uted in 1950, it provided no additional lwqnf'~t to i\fr. :\Jadnrlane, except
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upon the eontingenry of ti1e death of Mi~s Swan's father,
\,·ho wa~ it~ principal benefieiar\· and re~idual legateE'.
~!r. Swan\ death in 1950 resulted in a sub~tantial inaea~e in the petitioner's sharE' of the te:>tanlPntary
estatr. This Rhare, however, wa.~ substantiallY rednec,J
by the second codicil, executed in April, 19GL
.\fter her father's death, Gail'R sole heir was hPr
si~ter·, 'l'heo Hendee, of San .Franc.isco, with whom Gail
maintained a somewhat ho~tile, tempestuous and unpredictaUle relationship. (R. ~-!-.), :n:!, :\19). ThP.o had
received downtown bu~ines~ properties l"r·om hcl" grandfather and her mother (R. 242) and Gail rP.peatedly
told her ta..~ advisor and friend that 'fheo was amp!;
provided for and she did 110t intend to "leave her vrry
rnueh" {R. 312).
She had compll'tl"iY differP.nt in{P.ntions ahout J!r.
\facfarlane (R-. 312). He had iml"fered a detaehed retina
of the !ef"t eye in 1946. Later he lost the center vision
in 'that1 ,eye 1md in 1D50, the retina of the rip;hl eye
became detached. These afflictions required ~urger')' and
hospitalization and, of course, prevcnkd petitioner from
practicing law (R. 90, 111). Petitioner's troublPs greatly
di~iurbed Gail (R H18) and she stated on o:everal occasions that he might beeorne blind and she wanted to help
him. (R. :\12, ()2).
The will and the eodic·ils were prepared by petitioner in his office, in the usual manner, following
consulations with }.li:;s Swan (R. 91 d. seq.) Her teRta-
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JJIPntary intent was vt>ril'ied only by a medical and
['Sychiatric examination conducted prior to her execntio;, of the second codicil, which modified the will by
;;uhstantially decreasing the earlier bcque;;t to the petitioner. ( !t. 386).
Petitioner did not sngge~t independent legal adviee
be obtained before each testamentary instrument wa<;
signed. \Yhetber .\1 i:;~ Swan had, or would have l1eeded,
;;uch advice at any time between the dates of the original
11·i II and the second codicil will probably never be knovm.
\\'hen J.ii~o; Swan gave petitioner llcr ins1rnctions
about the change;; to he made in the will by the ,o.econd
rodicil, .~he asked to be examined h:· an "independent
doctor" in order "to be sure ... that the will cannot Ue
contr.·~1Pd" (R. 109). Her grandfat),e,··~ will wa~ contested. 1-n re Swa11'.~ l'sta.te (1918), 31 L'. !10, lj()
r . .J-3~. Petitioner, thcn'fore, made an appointme11t. for
her \\·itl1 Dr.)._ . .\!. Xiel~en. and after sowe f'xarnillation,
Dr. Nit>l~en. upon hi~ own initiatin'. asked a p~ycl1iutri~t.
Dr. Ho,· A. Darke. for eon~ultatiYf' n~--i~truwr IR ::!1-t).
A Hrr about an hour'~ examination, during wl1ich the

o:J.ortors quPstionerl ::\1 i;;~ ::-;mm a he lilt tl1e propo;;crl disJIO;;ition of her propert:, it ,,-n~ concluded that ·-~llP was
lm'n11dl" ;;ound and certainly- iu tl1e adult brarket" I R.
:..!!f1). :Dr. !l:1rke eondnded tlmt ::\li~;; Swan "knrw what
;;lu· 11 anh•d tP do" with her pl'i'pt'rty and that "~]IC' did
11 -i,.:h to do what ~he \Ya<=' ~a:-inp: ~!J,. wanted to do with
ln•r pnl)wrt_, ... ( n. :2:-;{ij. The two doctor~ accordingly
;;igJI(•d as \\·it11P;;~p;; to the codie.il.
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l<'ourteen month~ lalf'r, r.Ji~~ 8wan died without havin"0 made anv• additional changes in her tf'l'ltamentar,\·
disposition. The will wa~ admitted to probate and, several month~ later, Theo Hendee insiitntt>d the ·will conte8t ~uit which eulminated in tiJC deci;;ion of this Court
in t!Jt' S1Nuo case. In ib deci::;ion, this Court llCid that
the evidence ;;howed tlmt J!i~s Swan had tcslamentar:-·
capacity. In this respect, the deci::;ion reversed the jud~
ment of the trial court.
Bceau~e

or the relationship of laywer-dient ,,-hi<'Jl

had l'xi~ted bel ween .\tr. },-Jadarlane and J.Jio;r; Swan,
the Court held that his inelmion as a beneficiary in her
will raised a presumption of fraud and undue influenct>
and that thP presnm1Jlion thm,;t upon h.iut the burden of
persua;;ion-the burden
persuading the trier of the
fact that he had no't fraudulently imposed upon and influenced hi~ client's mind.

or

In the ·will contest case, the trial t'ourt was not convineeU thai thi~ burden had b('(·n carried and the Supreme Court, therefore, affirmed the der.i~ion and declared the bequest to the petitioner to he null and void.
1'he Trial Committee conr.luded that the presumption adopted h~· the Supreme Court in i he 8wt~n ea;;;e
''applie~ anU i.~ effediYe against tlw accused in this
diseiplinary proceeding." (R. 379).
\Vhen the Board of Commissioners of the Utah State
Bar adopted this conclusion and recommended that pet.iSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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tioner be disciplined by suspension from practice of the
law for a period of one year, this petition for review
followed.
STATf<JIIIEXT OF POINTS
POINT I
THE PRESUMPTION OF FRAUD AND UNDUE INFLUENCE, UTILIZED IN THE CIVIL WILL CONTEST
LITIGATION, SHOULD NOT BE APPLIED IN A DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDING.
POINT II

EVEN IF SUCH PRESUMPTION COULD PROPERLY
BE APPLIED IN A DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDING, THE
RECORD IN THIS CASE DOES NOT SUPPORT THE CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE BOARD
OF BAR COMMISSIONERS SINCE THE RECORD REVEALS
THE PRESUMPTION 'WAS CLEARLY REBUTTED.
POINT III

THE MERE ACT OF A LAWYER IK DRAFTING A
WILL BY WHICH HE MAY RE·CEIVE BENEFITS IS NOT
UNPROFESSIONAL AND IS NOT PROSCRIBED NOR PROHIBITED BY ANY CANON OF ETHICS, WRITTEN OR
UNWRITTEN, NOR BY ANY STATUTE, RULE OR DECISION OF THIS COCltT. RULE OF THE UTAH STATE
BAR OR THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, AND SUCH
ACT, STANDING ALONE, CANJ\OT SUPPORT A CHARGE
OF UNPROFESSIONAL CONDUCT.
POINT n·
EYL:N IF "THE ACTION OF THE BOARD OF COM.'Il!SSIONERS WERE OTHERWISE SUPPORTED BY THE
RECORD, THE DISCIPLINE RECOMMENDED IS HARSH,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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DISPROPORTIOKATE AND EXCESSIVE, PARTICULARLY
J)l vJF::W OF THE CENSURE ALREADY VISITED UPON
THE PETITIO;-mR DURING THE FIVE YEARS SlN·CE
THE CIVIL WILL CONTEST CASE WAS TRIED AMID
WIDE PUBLICITY.

POINT I
THB PRESU~1PTION OF FRAUD AND UNDUE INFLUEXCE, UTILIZED IN THE ·CIVIL WILL CONTEST
LTTIGATION, SHOULD NOT BF. APPLIED IN A DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDING.
l'hi~

Court, in the ,','u;.a.n coa~e, c;pceifirally di:>avowPd
any implication that its derision should enlarge the presumption to the stature or '"'eight of evidence. [ nstead,
it held that ''a pre~umption is the as:;umption of a fad.
required hy n rnlP of law from tlte establistHnent of another faet or group of ract.s. ft is not the fact<~ on whieh
it i~ hascd nor the inference to be dra1n1 therefrom, hut
a rule nf law fixing the legal consequences theecof ...
This does not mean that the fact finder may consider or
weigh thP presumption RS r•Yirlf.ncr." In r"P 81ran's Esloh• •
.283 P. :!d at. pag·e G90.
'l'his careful distinction by the Court cannot hP ignored. Particularly is this tme where t.he Court fnrtlwr
elaborated h.v C'llllJiwsi;-;ing that n1·it!lf'l" the as~umed fact
nor the rule of law lm.'l "an.v tcndcne~- in rea.t:0/1 to prove
thP existence of the presumed fact and, therefore, cannot
be weighed as evidence thereof.... " (Emphaflis added).
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From the foregoing, it is abundantly elf'ar that the
presumption utilized in the Swan ca;;e <'annot be substituted for evidence and cannot be considered as evidence.
Its sole function in that <:ase was to shift the burden of
persuasion for the IJurpose-~ of that ca:;c. That case is
finally and completely adjudicated and public policy,
,·:hich apparently dictated the use of the rule of law
giving rise to the presumption, has been satisfied.
Thi~

is a new and substantially different proceeding.
Except for the petitioner, the parties are completely
different. Even the petitioner ls here in a different role.
In the fonner cttse, he was a legatee who8c bcqnast was
attacked hy another legatee and nullified by the dccihlon
of the Court. 111 the present proceeding. he and his pro.
fessional life, training and career are at slake, in a
matter in which the parties arc the ·Court and the [tall
State Bar. By conducting tl1ic; review, the Court i~ m.
qui ring into 1he conduct of one of it~ officers. This fact
alone distinguislw~ this proceeding from all that may
haw' gonP. hP.fore.
A~ stated lly the Court in ··Jn re l:"rail~,

et al.'"

(l.tah, 19U) -±2 1'tal1 282. 130 P. 211, ''Who are the
pnrt ies to the disbarment proceeding~ Tlw petitioners
on the one c;"11l0: but who on the otherl Certainly not tlw
info1·mant. nor Th(\Jnn~ Xelson. lf there were another
pn.rty, ... it 1 1·n~ the eourt; for the proeeeding involved
maltrrs 1rholly lwh1·ee11 the court and the petitioners."
,Siner it. is evident that thi~ proceeding has nothing
kg-all~· in I'(HilllWll with the will em1test case. and sine~
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it mu~t be re(·ognized, in a disciplinary proceeding, tllllt
the power of a court l~, practically, without limit, i.t is
~ignificant to note that at no time in the proceeding,~

again::;t lhe petitioner to date has either side been able
to locat.P, or cite, any decision lJy any ('Dlll'l l1olding that
a _pre~umption of fraud and undm~ influence i~ lo be
utilized in a disciplinary proceeding. ::\L•ithPr has there
been fonnd run· authority upholding the discipline ol' an
attorney upon a claimed 1Jl'esumption, or 11pon a record

d1evoid of evidence or l'act showing an e-v-il act, a corr11pt
motiYe. or dishonest conrf'alment.

It is submitted that the

rea~on

for this dearth of

authority lie:> in the inhe-rently different Jlat.ure of a
disciplinary proceeding. The court~ have long reco;;nized that the vro~.:eeding if' nnique. They have al~o
recognized that in ~ueh a case there i,; a kind of "pre~umption of innocence" which inures to t}J(' benefit of
the accused lawyer. Sr·e for example, '( A.L.R. 93, in
which there will be found an annoiat ion entitled "Presumption of lnnocenee in Disbarment. PJ"Oceedinp:s."' lt
is there ~tated that as a general rule the attorney has tlll'
benefit of a pre~umption of innocence wl1en the true
burden of proof is recognizer].
The Supreme Court of \Vashington has stated the
proposition welL Jt held, in "In t·e Little" 24-± P. 2d .2:15,
that the disciplinary proeccding " ... is a special proeceding peculiar to itself ... " It then ·went on to :<U_v:
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"1'he respondent in o>uch a matter is, upon
his admi~siou to the Bar, certified by the Court
to have attained high rnotal and professional
standards. It is to be presumed that he ha:; maintained them and has performed his dut.y as an
officer or the Coutt iu accordance -..vith his oath.
Every doubt ~hould be r·csolvcd in his fa-vor, and
only upon a clear preponderance of the evidence
that the acts charged have been done and were
prompted by iwpropcr motives, should disciplinary adion be taken. The privilege - mrd it is a
privilege, not a right- to practice his profession
cannot be lost to the practitioner upon slight
evidence."
~\

somewhat similar thought has been expressed by
this Court in "In re Oliver'' 97 T~tah 1, 89 P. 2d 229. In
that case, the Court ·was considering the effect of one of
the ~ections of the "Revised Rules of the l)tah State Bar
Governing Professional Conduct and Di~eipline." At'Wr
rcfJognizing that, aE> to a member of the Bar who has
allowed his d1JPS to lapse, the Bar may qn~stio11 his legal
quali fieations to resume ~rtcrnbership, the Court pointed
out that th~ lapse of ti:ne do~s not ~ffect hi;; ~tanding
a~ a morally qualified, hut ,.;u;;p~nded, member of th~ Bar.
The ·Court 1hf'n went on to say:
"Xaturalh tllerP i~ the disadvantage to Uris
that the Bar {nu;;t assume the burden of proving
his lack or moral qualification: but this i~ in line
wi.tl1 onr accepted tlH.'or~· of trials. It far better,
after a nw.mber ha~ c.,;tnhlished his moral qualifications, a~ he does upon admission to the Bar,
to premme that t]w;;e qualifications remain with
him until ,;nrh ti.me a~ tiLe'~· arP taken away hy
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pt·oper Ilrocethtre, thm1 to pt'bUHI(' ill of him !illd
to requirP hiut to overcomP the last -prf'snmption."
.\ careful revil'l\ o£ the deci;,ion~ of this Court in
disciplinary JH''-ll'Cetling~ fail~ to reveal a single instance
where a presmnption 1nt~ either ttrgNl 1n· utilized a~ a
ba~is for di~ciplinary action. Instead, the clear imp~·rt
ol' Hw· decir;ions i;.; that evidenre i~ reqnirec:l, it mu~t be
,;ubstantial and eonYinring ill it~ 1wture, and nothing Jp~s
than evidence will snrficc.
Fot· l'XIllllplc, in "In 11 JlcCu!!IJuyh" Ui l'tall :'i:l:!,
95 P.:2d 13, the Court was asked to draw infcrem:L'~ l'rom
a SL·ries of fads which, as contended by the pro,;eention,
>'liowcd that solicitation of busine~s by one Spencer wn,;

at the direction of or with th2 lmowledge of the aeeused.
After examining the record, the Court found that there
were "rumors" and a SUS}Jieion of "ambulance "hasing:'
The Court eoneluded, however, that there had hPPn no
instance of f'olieitation f'hown "by clear and convincing
evidence." In a further di~wnc;sion of the evidPncP, the
f'ourt remarked, on this phaf'e of that eaf'.e, ··our attPntion has lwen called to no instance in vd1ich an attorney
was snf'.pended or disbarred on such meager evidence of
solicitation through a runnPr."

eenturies, it ha;; been univPrsally rer,ogniY.ed
that the court has had po\n'r to e>.rJ·cisc rigid {'Olllrol
over the professional rondue't of mcmberf' of ihc legal
profe;;;;ion. As pointed out b~· Judge Cardozo in People
v. C11/kin, 24N K.Y. 4()5, lfl2 X.E. 4S7, in very early daYs
~·or
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in ]!Jngland the court regulated the conduct of barristers
"with minute particularity, even in matters so personal
as the p:row'th of their beards or thE' cut of their dress."
The courts of this country are not shown by the
decisions to have wielded their power of control to this
extent. It was recognized early that the power to disbar" ... i~ not an arbitrary and despotic one ... but it
is the duty of the court to exereise and regulate it by a
sound and just judicial dir;cretion
" /';x parte 8ecombc, GO U. S. 9, 15 L. Ed. 565.
As stated hy the Supreme Court of illinois, in the
C'ase of !11 re Donaghy, 402 TIL 120,83 X.E. 2d 560,
"'!'he disbarment of an altorney i~ the destruetion of his professional life, his character,
and his livelihood. (citing cases) The court
should, thererore, di~bar in moderation. Like,
wise, the same consideration~ obtain in the applir_ation of a suspension rule. A removal of an
attorney from practire ... entail!\ the complete
loss of a clientele with its consequent uphill road
of patient waiting to again re-establish himself
in the eyes of the public, in the good graces of
the courts and his fellow lawyers."
'!'hi~

·Court. in harmony with the great weight of
authority, has long recognized that a disciplinary action
is of such seriom< nature and consequence to the accused
that its power ~hould be 0v•rcised only upon the basis
of "convincing proof." In re linuson (Utah, 1916) 158
P. n'i . .~s Uirth 167.
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In that <:aC'e, after dl~eus.~ing other element~ m a
disciplinary proeeeUing (in whieh disem;sion there is no
mention of a "presumption") Hte Court said:
'"The foregoing statement::; really contain the
\Vhole gist of the law, '1hich is sustained by both
reason and common :<ense. To dishtu an attornPy
i~ a very seriou::; ;nn(tc-r indeed. lt not only may
dl'l'rive him of gaining a livelihood for himself
and a dependent fanlil.l', but it may, and usually
does, result in prcvcn t ing him from making available all anteeedcnt prrparation, altl1ough that
may eover pradically the period of a lifetime.
In no other ealling are such far-reaehing conse(JUCnecs vi~ited upon a delinquent who lm::; not
been found guilty of ~orne felonious ad. TllC
rule, therefore, that the evidenee <~hould be deal"
am] eonvindng is haspd npon a most solid foundation."
::io suc~t "solid foundation"' suppo.:-t~ the abortive
use of tltP presumption of fraud in the pre<~ent inquiry.
Tt has no ba~is in social or legal hi<~tory. ft cannot he
supported upon the basis of reason or log-ic because, a<~
~tated by the Court in lhe b'~tan ease, neithet· t.he fad::<
nor the rule of law involved in the presumption "have
any tendency in reason to prove the exi~tenee of the
presumed fad and, therefore, eannot be weig-hed as
evidence thereof ... "
Jn aeeord with this prineiple is the decision of tlw
KewYork court in "In re Spencer," :!01 X.Y. Supp. 31;),
206 App. Div. 806. Spencer was aeeused, in a total of
nine charges, of viola'ting the code of ethics. In one count
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he was charge-d with having procured by misconduct,
fraud and dishonesty, two real estate mortgages from
his client and thereafter, procuring the assignment thereof to his wife, at a time when l1is client was incompetent
to transact businc~s. The assignments were drawn hy
him in his clieJll.'s bedroom, when he and ;;he were ~:~lone.
As to Ihis count, the court said:

"There may be, and probably io>, a presumption against the validity o[ this transaction, and
il' it were brought in qne~lion !Jy pcrsono: interested in ... the estate, and who were prejudiced
by it, VN_\ likely the burden would be cast upon
respondent to show that the transaction was free
from fraud and nndt1e influence on hi~ part It
doc8 not appear that. the transaction has been
questioned lJ;>' those per~om. If re:;pondent's
testimony in thi~ proeeedi11g is accepted, the
transaction was honest and straightforward.
'l'here was an opportunity and motive for respondent to take advantage of }Ii~~ Sharp's
enfeebled condition; whether he did or not, no
one living knows. /J1 a proceeding of this character, I do not tlii11k if un1 be found a.s a fact
tlwt he did. (l<;tilpha><i~ added)
This is but another wa~ of .«tating that a presumption of fraud, wltidt arhitrarih- ari~e.« from the nature
of the confidential relationship, \\ill not be aecepted as
a sulwtitntt• for proof, or n,; sa(i~fudory proof upon
wl1id1 to predicate the discipline or an attornPy.
To our krw11-ledge, no court lw,; eYN indulged m
><nch a presumption or a~sumption durinR a disciplinary
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proceeding involving circumstances such as are present
here. Instead, the courts have recognized the punitive
nature of the proceeding and have drawn inferences m

favor

or, and not against,

the accused.

For example, more than si...,dy years ago the Supreme

Court ol' Cali l'omia in a disciplinar~y proceeding entitled
''In re Ila.yrnomi" 50 P. R9!-J, ruled that " ... all intendtnents are in favor or the accused." '!'he :,mne rule, e:xprcs~ed in different language, is found in later California cases. In Browne v. 8tu./c Bar of California
(19fii'i) 287 P.2d 745, the court held" ... ~-iny reasonable
doubts mu:;l. he rE'solYed in favor of the accused". 'ro
the same efrecl i~ lhc earlier Calirornia CJJ.se of Ililde-

lHand v. State Har of Califo-rnia, 117 P.2d NiiO.
In view of the nature of thi;; proceeding, and in tlJC
light of the- legal principles and aut.horii ie~ already mentioned, petitioner earne~tly <:ontend8 that the Board of
Commissionem of the Utal1 State Bar committed manifest error in adopting the conclu~ion of il.ii Trial ·Comntittee that "the prefmmption mentioned by the SuprPme
Court" in the S1Frm case ''applieR and i~ effective againo:t
the aeeused in thi~ di;.wiplinary proceedi~Jg." 'l'he Board
then compounded the error l1y recommending diRcipline
against the petitioner upon the ba~i~ of this mere presumption, which a.ro~c J'rom a rule or law, utilized in
private civil litigation, at a time when, and under rirrmu~tanees in which, none of the conRiderations which
are now before t.his Co11rt were present.
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POINT II
EVEN IF SUCH PRESC:IlPTION COULD PROPERLY
BE APPLIED IN A DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDING, THE
RECORD IN THIS CASE DOES NOT SL"PPORT THE CONCLUSIO:-rS AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE BOARD
OF BAR COMMISSIO::->rERS SINCE THE RECORD REVEALS
THE PRESUMPTION WAS CLEARLY REBUTTED.

'!'he Prosecuting Committee ha~ repeatedly ronceded that it must fail in this pro~ecution, if the presumption of fl·aud is not utilized, because it has no extrinsic evidenee of fraud or undue innuence npon which
to rely.
A careful examination of the record reveals the
neC'essii,v for this concession. Xo fad wa>I ever brought
before the Trial CommittE'e, or the Board of Commissioners, which tended to Rhow an) act of fraud or influence upon the part of the petitioner.
N"ot for a moment do we r,oncedc that tl;e presulllplion of fraud and undue influence, utilized in the S1nw
,•as,·, shoukl be applied here. We confe~s our inability
to understand how it i~ even possible or application in a
disciplinary proceeding where the cvidcnC'c presented
against an attomcy Jllust be "clear and ('OuYiTwinp:" and
his guilt must be "clearl:• l'~tahlislwd." [u re .lhCullo·ugh, 97 t Ttal1 :i:n 95 P.2d 13.

To appl_1· the presumption here is to relieve the
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stead, to plaee it upon the accused, under circumstances
where neither he, nor the Bar, can h.11ow from judicial

precedent. the extent of the proof required to overeome
it.
However, for the purposes of argument, we ~hall
assmne that the prosecution i~ entitled to thu benf'fit of
the presumption. It seems to concede, because i(. could
not properly do otherwise, that it ha;; nothing else upon
which to ba~c .iis claim. As t.hc S11preme Court said, i11
the Swv..n case, Cxcept for the presumption·' ... the trial
court's finding of fraud and undue in f'lucncc probably
is not supported by the evidence." (pp. G87 and 688 of
29:\ P.2d). The prosecution can properly find no eomfort in the Sll'an deeision, became nothing in that dPcision (·ompP.ls any l'inding ol' fraud. lnstcad, the court
held that the burJcn o[ persua~ion was upon the peti1ioncr ju the will contest case, and that the Supreme
Court could not say, as a matter of law, that he had
sustained it. The Court held, on this point, in spmkin!=!:
of Mr. :Macfarlane and a <lO-d<lfendant:

" . . . although they dearly made a prima
facie ~bowing, the l'i111liug against them on that
issnP must be approved because it indicates that
the trial court. was 110t convinced 1haJ. the fact::;
arf' in thf'ir lavor."
This is nothing more than 1~ said by the f'ourt repeatedly in affirming jury verdicts. In such cases, the
Court a£finns because the jury was not convinced in
favor of the appellant but, this i01 not the same as saying
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that tiK' weight of eviden<>c wa~ again~t such an appellant,
hecau~e if he had had ihe hurrlen 01' [!I"UOf upon the i~~\le,
lrc would fail, and the vcrdid "-ould lie against him, if
the evidence were PI[Ualiy [,n!arh'l.'d.
Expre~sed

in lJer·~~_.Htage~, if the total weight of evideneG in a civil suit is viewed as 100 per cent, he upon
whom the !JunlGrr or pL'r~ua~iou fall~ rnu~t convince the
trier of the l'ad~ lr_1- the greater weig·ht of that evidence
or hy more than 50 pereent" of the r,videJl(·e. If, after
the prooi' i~ in, the evidence is viewed as equally halanr·cd,
the burrlen ol' per~nasion has noJ been rarriPd hy him
and, u_p011 U[IJ'Pal, the deci&ion ·will be affirmed hy the
Supr·ernc Court.
Therel'ore, i11 the Stmn case, while the aecuHcd may
have plac·ed 50 percPnt of the weight of evirlcneG upon
the scale~. he did not com'"ince the lower· eourt that he
had done mor·e. The decision doe~ not at tempi to evaluate the evidence, since a v.ill contest <.'ase is an action
at law.
To draw any additional infL'rtlll'e<:' fr<>ut the 81r1111
decision, to dai!rr that petitioner pr·odueerl lrss than 50
per<.'ent of the cvidrnre and that the contr~lanl~ produced
rnon•, 1~ to ~train llw derision lw:-·1md it~ meaning.
Y1't ' thi~ is nre\'i~l'IY
,.
. whnl the Board of Cnnrmissioner.s has done in this proceeding. It has conduded, in
paragraph 3 or the conclu~iom< nl' il;:. Trial Co,nmittee
""lim I thP 1H'O'\l.~l'd u~ed frand and undue influence to1\·ard
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.\liso: S'van and that r;aid actions were a bread1 of his
fiducial relationship, and is (sic) unproFessional conduct as a member of the Bar of the State of' Utah."
Thi~

conclusion cannot be supported by any extension of the Court's decision in the Sumn case, and ccrlainly is not supported by the cvidcnee in thi;, record.
The only evidence in tlw record, on the pro::;ccution's
side of the ledger, is the evidPnce that petitioner wa:> the
attorney for 11i~s Swan, that he drew a will in 1947, a
codicil in 1950 and a second codicil in 1951 and that in
each of these testamentary doeurnent:>, be was named as >t
beneficiary of a valuable portion of Miss Swan's cst.ale.
Additionally, there is evidence that the only disintere6ted
and independent consultation experienced by the te,;tatrix resulted .hom a medical and psyehialric examination conducted immediately prior to the execution of the
seeond codicil.
Opvosed to this evidence, and opposed to the presumption the prosecution o;eeks io draw from it, is the
unequivocal denial of the petitioner that he exereised or
utilized any fraud or undue influence at any time in hifl
dealings 11·i t h the testatrix, the te~timony of di ~i ntcrc~ted
witnes~e.~ that the testatrix desired to make surh di,;position of her property and had. expr·essed a repPated
r·oncern for the welfare of the }Ktitioner, and finally and
perhaps most important, the pr·ofessional, ci-.,.ie and
personal ~tanding and reputation of the petitioner· wlrich
looms upon the record unas,;ailed, uncontradicted and
unimpeached.
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'l'he record reveals p<'titioner has practiced at the
Bar of this Court for thirty-two years, following his
education in the public ;;chools and the University of
Ctah. He i;; now age sixty, the l'ather of five childrE'n and
grandfather of six.
Ife has tv1ice been Pleded ily lii6 district as a member
of the House of Representatives in the LegislaturG and
twice elected a member of the State SeT1atc. During hi~
service ir1 the latter ehamber, he \1as elerted Pre~ident
of rhe State Senate in 1941 and again in 1943.
1[e ha~ RPITed a~ Prf'sident of the Exehange Club in
Salt Lakf' Cit,v and haii n~reived the unique honor of
selection as National President of that organi~ation. At
the time of the hearing of thi;; matter hf' wa~ sNving a~
:\'ational Prf'sident of hir: college fraternal organization.
In addition, he has been active in the local council of the
Boy Sconb of America and in other community and civic
affair~.
Hi~

professional practice has been general in it~
nature and he has ahmy6 practiced alone. In addition
to his professional interest~. in ~·ear,; past he en:-;ag"ed in
busine~~ activitie~ in the ranching, mining and eon6h'lll'tion lm.~inl'~:<l'~ (li. :l+:;, f't ~f'q.).
This di><l'\l~~ion of the f'vidence ~huw~ cunYincingly
that the record preponderates in favor of the pditioner.
A>< will now be clemcm,.;trnted, the inferences from the
rvidew·r and from the unu~unl manner in which this
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di~ciplinary

ha~

proceeding

there effediv.-

~npport

been eonU.ueted, lend r·ur-

to the petitioner's

cau~e.

At tlw hearing on January 9, 1938, ·when the
denliary port ions of

thi~

CVI-

record, including the complete

and verbatim testimony of the petitioner, were introduced, coun:>el for petitioner, in hi;.; opening r;tatement
(R 304) and later, at the

eonelu~ion

of

t}l(~

delense,

a~

Slued the Trial Committee that petitioner ''would an~~~·rr

any question::> ,you might have or
eoncerning thi,; matter.'' (R. :147)

an~·one

might have

None of the law}'ers of cilhC'r t.he 'l't·ial Committee
or the Prosecuting Committee ac-cepted this opportunity
to determine fot themselves ·whether petitioner, in ex]ilaining his con duet, pos~essed that degree of candor and
honL·~ty which would enable them to view his testimony
with confidence.
'l'he failure of the Trial Committee to make im1uir.v
at that time is, in fairness, understandable since it had
not then had the opportunity to read the record and it
could not I hrn know \>"hether imJuiry would be useful.
So sueh explanation is available, however, to justify
the Commil.tee's Rilence- on April :30, Hl58, when the
hearing ·was reconvened for oral argument. Although
petitioner again -,vas present and available, neither the
Trial Committee no1· the l'ro~ecuting Committee bothered to ask a single que-stion.
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'Ve view this silenr,e a~ Jlndicularly ~ig·nificant and
as indicative of the fact that this Committee, in passing
judgment in 19G8 on the prof'c::isional conduct oF the
petitioner', wa,; content to rely upon what he said in
tp,;timony given more than five year.~ earlier, in a lJitterly contested trial involving different partie~, different
eounsel, different i~~~w" ol' fad and law and vaHtly diffPrPnt stakes.
ln additiorr, at tlie hearing of April 30, 1958, it lrad
hccorue apparent, and it still is, that there was a glariTig
inconsi~tcrw:· in the pro~r1·ution's rasf', revealing a ~ub
~tantial variaTrt·l_' hctwccn ihc charge and the proof. The
Committee did not seek an explanation. The Prosecuting
Committee did not volunteer one. The inferences which
may be drawn from thio: inconsistency will hL' apparent
from the following:
The complaint <'hargcd the petltwncr with profe~,
sional ulif'conduct in that, after he prepared the will i11
1947, thereafter he "prepared various codicils to said
wil!, in tach of which his interest as a benefi:cilary became
increasinqltJ more mli"autapcnn.,· lu liim." (1•;mphasis
added)
This is patently untrue, as n•Yraled Ly the doruments tlt('III~Plves (R. 3Sii). They show that hy the will
of l\fay 2, 1947, petitioner would have received one piece
of property. Under the terms of the first codir·il in February, 19GII. hi~ positiou \l:lS unchanged unless and until
a contingenr>y occurred. On the date of the codicil, in
viE-w of the un(•rrtaintiP~ of health of thof'E' invoh-pd, no
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one could have predicted whether the contingency would
happen bcfor·e the death of the te~tatrix.
1'he contingency did occur, however, and as matter~
thrn stood, petitioner's bequest had inereased hecauRe the
contingency resulted in the addition of four other· properties, t.ogelhe-r with that already mentioned in the will
it~elf.

In April, 19Gl, the seeond codicil was executed and,
by its terms, two of the five properties were devised to
someone else thus decreasing, not inereasing, petitioner's
stated ber1uest, all of which j,; contr·ary to the charge6
a~~ertcd against him.
If, as is contended, petitionel' had iutended to perpetrate [raud upon his client in the te~tamentary di6position of her estme, 11l•y would he have taken measures
to insure the validity of the second codicil ''hen, Ly o:o
doing, he received Je~s than he ·would llllve rer-eived ir
lte had done nothing·!
Thifl incomistency in the theory of the prosecution
lias never 1Jeen explained. The '{'rial Dommitiee and the
pro;;ecution have ignored it, 1>·hi1·h only serves lo emphasize that the inferences to be drawn ft·orn it support, and
are eonsistent with, the i>mocem·1• of the pelii.ioner". \Yhcn
thesP inferrnee~ are eouplrt.l with the nnconiradietet.l
testimony of the petitioner, the unimpeached testimony
of disinterested >vitnes,;es ("onrPrning the intent of the
testatrix and with the outstanding personal, civic and
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profe;:;~ional

record of the pctitimJCr, the conclusion i.e;

ine;;capable that the reconl does not support the eondu~ion~ and reeomutendation~ of the Board of Bar ComITIIS~i0ll6l'S.

POli"T III
THE MERE ACT OF A LAWYER I:-:1 DRAFTING A
WILL BY WHICH HE MAY RECEIVE BENEFITS IS NOT
UNPROFESSIONAL AND IS :-:lOT PROSCRIBED :-JOR PROHIBITED BY A)JY CA::.!ON OF ETHICS, WRITTEN OR
UNWRITTEN, :t\OR BY A::-JY STATUTE, RULE OR DECISION OF THIS COURT, RULE OF THE L"TAH STATE
BAR OR THE AMERlCAN BAR ASSOCIATIO::-r, AKD St:CH
A·CT, STANDING ALONE, CANNOT SUPPORT A CHARGB
OF UNPROFESSIONAL CO~DUCT.

After the ruling of the trial z·ourt in the 11 ill conh·~L
rase and again after tl1i;; Court handed down it;: deci.~ion
upon appeal, tltPI'f' arose in some legal l'irdf's aery for
p~·titioner'~ professional scalp ber.ause, it was said, he
lmd ''breached the etlti(·~" of the profe~:-;ion.
Upon the hearing in this ruattPr, the Trial Committee was inlormed by counsel that the matters involved
did not appear to he pro~cribed hy, and petitioner 1rn~
not charged ,,-jt!J a Yiolation of, ''any canon. any opinion
ol' the committee construing canons. any violation of n
rtah rule of bar procedure, a11_Y violation of a ~tatute,
i11l'ormal order, opinion, ~lntPJll('llt or anything t>l~l\ t'Xcept the opinion of a great many lfn1·y~·r,; who now, after
the 81can •kt·ision has been rendered, c.t l'o"t ract(J
realizP tl1~tt they lmew it wn,:; 'l·rm1g all along" \R. :-Hi:'.).
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'l'lw Prosecuting Committee did not difqmte th.is eontendon which was again

as~erted

in the informal hearing

before the Board or Bar Commissioners. lt was tlwre
contended, as it is now, that a charge oi' u11profe:;;sional
t·unduct cannot be supporteU by proof that a la\\)'er
drafted a 1vill hy whieh he might receive benef'its unless
there are additional fadors proved as evidence ol' a
rraudulent or corrupt intent.
This is not to say that a lawyer act::; >vi~ely i I' ite
dra\\ ~ such a wilL As stated by the Court of Appeals
of \"ew York in the well-known case rnlit.led "Jlp P11fliam," 257 N.Y. 140, 177 :\.E. 399,
"Attorneys for C'lients who intend to leave
tlwm or their families a bequest would do well to
have the will drawu by ~orne otlwr la"\\'Yer. Any
;;u~pieion whieh may arise of improper influence
used under the covet· o[ the confidential relationship may UHis b0 avoided."
But petitioner is here not charged with heing unwi~e. He is rhargcd \vith unprofe~sional condurt hera usc
of thP.ll~C of" f'raud and nndnr inf111i'lll'6.
"\Ve believe it significant that there have been many
dc0isiona by lT\an,\· courts inYolving will~ preparr.d hy
lawyer~ who al~o were beneficiaries tJ1ereof but in 110
instan~e havr. we found a Jeci~ion, and none wa~ cited
to n~ by the prosecution, where the court condemned
the attornr._,'s actions as p1·of'cs:>ional r11i~conduct, in the
absence of additional fact~ . ..-;1~1· for- example, "Re Pul-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

28
1wm," supra; Mntter of Ki1u!IH:rg',; Will, X.Y., 100 K.E.
7~!!; .Marx v.llfcGlynn, S8 N.Y. 357.

The comment of the Supreme CoUI1 of Idaho in
1946 i~ pertinent here. In Su·ari11gen v. Swans/1om, 105
P.2d 692, the Idaho Court observed:
'·lf the relation of attorney and client or
IJiincipal and agent e:-;isting between the parties
i~ sufficient to constitute undue influence by the
attorney or ag·cnt' over tlw }Jf'ineipal, it would
throw open many \\ill~ Jo l'tlutr;;t; awl, on the
contrary, an existence of such a relationship often
furnishes potent rea~ons for the execution of a
will in J'avor of sud1 an attorney or agent (Citing
<>ascs ) ."
Thm;e who have been trained under Anglo-.\meril"an juri;;prudence and who have been honored hy admisllion to the Bar of this StatE' have, ~inec our Parliest
Pxposure to the Jaw, cherished the concept that the law
permits no punishment without proof of violation of a
rule which, ·while perhaps not kn011·n or ·widely understood, is at least subject to a~eertainment. Snrh rule.~ are
for tl1e guidanre of the bench and Bar. :'\o such rule C'an
her<> be founrl.

'!'his situation J» nn! unlike that which confronted
the ~uprenlf' Court of Ca\il"ornia in 1950 when it decided
Hilddmwd r. State flor of Cali_tiJruia. :.::.:;1 P. 2d 508.
That wac; a proceeding to review a recommendation of
1he Board of Governors of the State Bar of California
llwt petitioners should be disciplinerl heran;;p tll('_l· had
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participated in a plan under wl1ich a labor union estab-

lished a legal aid department to assist injured members
of the union in proeuring legal counsel.
The decision of the Court -.,vas in favor of petitioners
and was expressed in the following language;

" ... in the absence of any prior deci~ion m
this State holding that it was improper for petitioner;; to participate in such a plan in the manner
above described, it is our conduo;ion that the ends
of justice ·will be served by di~missing the present proceeding >vithout disciplinary action, thereby pennitting this opinion, a:; the fir::.t expre;;sion

of the views of this Court upon the subject, to
serve prospectively as a guiilc to the HIC'lnbcrs of
the profeo:sion generally, rather than to serve
retrospectively to the dei riment of petitioner~."
POINT IV
F.VE:-:f IF THE ACTJOK OF' THE BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS WERE OTHERWISE S"CPPORTED BY THE
RECORD, THE DISCIPLINE RECOMMENDED IS HARSH,
DISPROPORTIONATE AND EXCESSIVE, PARTICULARLY
IX VIEW OF THE CE:-:TSURE ALREADY VISITED UPON
THE PETITIONER DURTNG THE FIVE YEARS SINCE
THE CIVIL WILL CONTEST CASE WAS TRIED AMID
WIDE PUBLICITY.

Should thi~ Court disregard our conteniiom; and
determine the issues against the petilioner, it will then
be confronted with the problem of what, if any, discipline
should be imposed.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

30
\Ye do not intend to presume or to encroach upon
thf' power of the Court \Yhen ·we suggest that the recommended discipline is har~h and improper. In frrirnc::;s,
hO\I'('Yf'l", it o;hou\d l1e ~ta,ted that l)etitioner has a]rea~ly
undE'rg-orw, rt~ a re;;ult of the publicity attendant upon
the prior litip:alion and attendant upon this proceedin~·
five year~ of !Hlhlic opprobrium, manifested b.1- the lo"."
of the esteem ol' many of his fellow practitioner;> and
fellmv citizen::;. As may be readily imagined, his praetic,_•
ha~ sharpl: dwindled.
Regardlc~,.;

of what oceurs in this case, petitioner
l 1 as a long and uphill road to travel in his efforts to r~
e~tablish himself.

COXCLLBION
There is more lwre at stake than "\lr. ~Iael'arlanr·'~
personal and profes~ional career. There i~ a principlethe priTl('iple that no la\vyer should ~Land convicted in
his profe~~ion except upon proof whieh '·c·learl;.- c~tab
lishes hi:-; guilt." If la\' y:or6 in thi~ State a1·e to be conviderl upon p1·e;;umptions - presumption~ which may
var~· in efl'cd "·ith the case, or the court, or the decision
in which thr.\· are applied, and if law~ rr.;: are to !w con\·idcll of violatiJI!-" an unwritten rule of condnct. without
proof of improper lllotiw. cl.·~ig-n or ad- then tlu" practil'\' of this profe1<:<ion may haYC become so unpredictahlf'
and so uncertnin that onh· those 'l-ith rlairvoyant fore·
sight and peret•ption will presume to undertake the mana.,·t•nJrnt of the I'Onfi(kntial nffair:< of tl1eir rlient,.
'
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Tt is respectfully submitted that the proceedings
should be dismissed and the petitiom~r be exonPrateJ
t·ornpletely of the chaJ'gt_$ and implications n~scr(.ed
against him.

JOHN H. S;\10"\V and
HAROLD G. CHRISTENRF;K
101 Continental Bank Building
Salt Lake Cit~·, Utah

Attorneys for Petitioner
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